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Abstract
As in other policy areas, one of the significant characteristics of EU social policy is the critical
role played by the ECJ in its policy development. This paper analyses the effect of the leading role
of the judiciary in the EU.
The ECJ intervention is usually discussed using the dichotomy as “neo-liberalism” against
“Social Europe”, or Community responsibility versus Member-states autonomy (F. Scharpf).
Building on the argument proposed by Menedez (2010), which contrasts individualistic rights put
forward by the ECJ with solidarity, this paper offers a new perspective to understand the political
tension inherent in the EU social policy.
The paper illuminates two elements of EU social policy. One is the “collective order” element.
This element characterizes the “form” of EU social policy, most prominent in the Articles 153 – 155
of the TFEU. The other is the “individual rights” or citizenship element, which is prominent in the
“content” of EU social and employment policy. This element is further enhanced by the ECJ-
induced policy development. 
These two elements are potentially in conflict. This inherent contradiction is manifest in
recent labour cases, namely Laval, Viking, Rüffert and Luxemburg cases. Through the examination
of the cases and responses of various political and social actors, this paper contends that it is not
the question of whether liberal or social Europe. Rather, the conflict is between the individual and
the collective element of the social and employment policy. 
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The Effect of the Judiciary-Induced Policy Development: Collective Order versus Individual Rights
in EU Social and Employment Policy
Ryosuke AMIYA-NAKADA (Meiji Gakuin University)
1.Introduction
As in other policy areas, one of the significant characteristics of EU social policy is the critical
role played by the ECJ in its policy development. This paper analyses the effect of the leading role
of the judiciary in the EU. Theoretically, the paper contends that the judiciary-induced policy
making affects the “content” of the policy. Substantially, the paper introduces a new perspective of
“individual versus collective” element in the analysis of EU social and employment policy and
demonstrates its relevance.
The ECJ intervention is usually discussed within the dichotomy as “neo-liberalism” against
“Social Europe”, or Community responsibility versus Member-states autonomy (F. Scharpf).
Building on the argument proposed by Menedez (2010), which contrasts individualistic rights put
forward by the ECJ with solidarity, this paper offers a new perspective to understand the political
tension inherent in the EU social policy.
The paper illuminates two elements of EU social policy. One is the “collective order” element.
This aspect of social and employment policy making is shared by the many, if not all, of the
Member States. This element constitutes the “form” or the procedural characteristic of EU social
policy, most prominent in the Articles 153 - 155 of the TFEU.
The other is the “individual rights” or citizenship element, which is prominent in the “content”
of EU social and employment policy. This is necessary for the well functioning of the Internal
Market. This element is further enhanced by the ECJ-induced policy development. But it is
potentially in contradiction with the “collective order” element in that the protection of the individual
right may sometimes erode the solidarity foundation of the collective order,
This inherent contradiction is manifest in recent labour cases, namely Laval, Viking, Rüffert
and Luxembourg cases. Through the examination of the cases and responses of various political
and social actors, this paper contends that it is not the question of whether liberal or social Europe.
Rather, the conflict is between the individual and the collective element of the social and
employment policy. 
Here, the role of the ECJ is critical. The ECJ cannot, as supranational judiciary, rely on a
specific understanding of “collective order”, unlike the Member State court like the German Federal
Constitutional Court. It also needs to secure the Four Freedoms and protect the individual rights
enhanced by the ECJ itself through expansive interpretation of the European Citizenship clauses.
As a result, the ECJ has in-built tendency to give priority to the individual elements. This means
that a specific configuration of policy-process, namely the leading role of the judiciary, affects the
content of the policy, which is the theoretical point of the paper.
In the next section, the paper highlights the "collectivist" element in EU social policy in the
- 2 -
spread of corporatist policy-making. The third section illuminates the individualistic aspect and the
reach of the Union Citizenship. 
2.Elements of Collectivism in the EU Social Policy Domain
In this section, we will make an overview of the collectivist elements in the EU social policy
domain. We first review the development of the "Corporatist policy community" (Falkner 1998) at
the EU level and its application to the civil society involvement. Then we show a dynamic up- and
downloading of this inclusion strategy between the EU and the national level.
(1) Construction of Collectivist Policy-Making Structure
One of the remarkable characteristics of the policy process in the EU social policy-making
is the framework of corporatist involvement of employer and employee organizations. Its origin can
be traced back to an initiative of Jaques Delors in the 1980s, so-called "Val Duchesse Social
Dialogue". During the 1991 treaty reform resulting in the Maastricht Traty,  enhancement of social
policy competence was on the agenda. Due to refusal of the United Kingdom under the reign of the
Conservatives, the "Social Protocol attached to the Treaty was signed by the Member States
except Britain. In the article three of this "Agreement on Social Policy Concluded between the
Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland", the "task of promoting the consultation of management and labour at
Community level" was assigned to the Commission and it was tipulated that the Commission shall
consult management and labour on the possible direction of Community action before submitting
proposals in the social policy field. In the article four, the conclusion of agreement between
management and labour and its implementation through a Council decision. As the British
Government switched the course after the victory of the Labour in 1997, the Protocol was
integrated into the Treaty by the Amsterdam Treaty. These clauses form the basis of current
legislative initiatives in the social policy domain.
Under this framework, a certain number of policy decisions have been made[1]. Ten
agreements have been resulted in the Council decision, most famously examplified by the Parental
Leave Directive, the Part-time Work Directive and the Fixed-term Work Directive. Further, eight
autonomus agreements have been concluded. As we have examples of legislation without
negotiation of the Social Partners (eight cases) or after failed negotiation (two cases), it is
impossible to say that the Social Dialogue lies at the centre of social policy-making. Sill, there are
much larger number of non-binding agreements including code of conduct (ten cases), joint
declaration (87 cases) and joint opinion (343 cases).
The Commission has been trying to expand the scope of this involvement strategy beyond
the traditional social partners (Amiya-Nakada 2004). It is shown in the text of the failed
Constitutional Treaty. In the Part One of the Treaty, the Title Six was named "the Democratic Life of
the Union", which In the current Lisbon Treaty, the clause is inherited without change. 
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This clause is not a new invention but an attempt to consolidate administrative practices
carried out since 1990s. The "Civil Dialogue"  is a phrase dedicated to a policy dialogue
mechanism established between the Commission and civil society organizations, besides the
"Social Dialogue" between the social partners. In contrast to the social partners, which can be
more or less clearly defined, "civil society" is more diffuse and ambiguous word. But the
Commission has not intended to establish a pluralist-type relationship with this sector. Rather, they
sought to build up a more targeted ann structured relationship to the sector. For that purpose, the
Commission helped the sector to form an umbrella organization with financial help and policy
incentive. The most prominent example here is the "Social Platform" which reagard themselves as
the leading voice of the civil society sector. In the EU documents, those priviledged policy actor is
referred to as "Organized Civil Society", which is called on in the targeted policy dialogue, in
different from more open ones.
As shown above, the Commission, especially the Directorate-General of Social and
Employment Affairs, has been pursueing the strategy of corporatist involvement of societal actors.
The aim is to bypass and wealen the resistance of the Member States against social policy
proposals, and to give more sense of legitimacy to the EU social policy.
(2) "Uploading" and "Downloading" of Policy-Making Structure
It is quite obvious that this corporatist policy making mechanism is far from original as it has
been widespread practice in meny member states. But where did it concretly come from? This
question is relevant as there are far smaller number of countries which have formally codified and
legitimised that practice. Sweden, for example, does not have any constitutional basis for the
corporatist policy-making even in the era of the "Swedish model". In the case of Austria, the
codification of the Sozialpartnerschaft was attempted in the 1950s, which was deemed
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Austria. Thereafter, the "Parity Commission"
had been developed and institutionalised wthout formal structure.
Falkner (1998: 84-96) has already made clear that the introduction of those Treaty clauses
was triggered by the initiative by the Belgian delegation with their "labour Committee" plan,
although the Commission was making efforts for their adoption. It should be pointed out here that
the Beligian initiative was effective not only in the formal, procedural sense, but also in substance.
In Belgium, the bipartite National Cooperation Committe set up in 1944 had continued its work after
the end of war [2]. This committee was given formal status in 1952 as the Nationale Arbeidsraad/
Conseil National du Travail. The mere exsistence of those consultative organs was not remarkable
in the postwar west european context, like the Economic Council (1946 Constitution) and the
Economic and Social Council (1958 Constituionn) of France, or the Social and Economic Council
of the Netherlands (1950). What is remarkable in Belgium is its competence. The National Council
of labour is exceptional in its formal legislative function. The 1968 amendment of the law (Loi du 5
decembre 1968 sur les conventions collectives de travail et les commissions paritaires) expanded
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the power of the National Council. It was now possible to make a nation-wide collective agreement
between the social partners legally binding, by an application of either the management or the
labour. Based on this competence, 101 binding collective agreements have been concluded as of
the end of 2010 [3]. Judging from the roles during the negotiation process and the realised
structure, the corporatist policy community at the EU level can be said to be "uploaded" from
Belgium.
Further, interesting examples of "downloading" of coporatist structure can be found in recent
years. In France,  a practice of intersectoral national agrement between management and labour
had already been in place for a long time. In the new millenium, however, new elements have been
added. In the parliamentary debate of the 2004 law on life-long learning and social dialogue, the
Minister made his intention clear that legislative proposals on labour laws sould be first negotiated
between the social partners. This proposal was given a concrete foundation by the 2007 law on the
modernization of the Social Dialogue, which obliges the government to consult the social partners.
In Austria, architypical corporatist country without formal delegation, the 2008 constitutional
amendmend (BGBl Ⅰ 2008/2) finally made corporatism formal. This "Social Partner Clause" is
clearly influenced bu the EU treaties. Not only the wording of the Treaties and the Austrian
Constitution is quite similar, but also an expert drafting the amendment cofirmed that this
resemblance is intentional and the new competence falls within already conferred powet by the EU
law (Öhlinger 2008).
As is shown above, collectivist policy-making structure is widespread throughout Europe. It is
established by the dynamic uploading and downloading processes between the Member States
and the EU. Thus we may say that collectivism is at least a part of the emerging European order.
3. The Effect of the ECJ Judgements and the "Citizenship Turn" of the EU Social Policy
In contrast to the tendency described above, we can also find the elements of individualism/
individualization in the EU social policy. Below, we will substantiate this argument with several
examples. The role of the ECJ is instrumental in this regard, as the "right" protection of individual is
suited to transnational adjudication especially after the "Union Citizenship" acquire the status of
quasi-fundamental rights.
(1) Centrality of the "Four Freedoms"
In comparison with the political process in the Member States, the EU policy process is
characterised by the autonomy of each policy domain. This is due to step-by-step progress of
integration and the patch-work like distribution of competence between the EU and the Member
States (cf. "five policy modes" by Wallace (2010)). Further, a political commanding height of co-
ordination like party government or president  is lacking. Still, it is without doubt that construction of
the Common Market has been the central policy concern throughout integration process. In this
area, the competence given to the EU is comparatively wide and the rule-enforcing power is rather
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strong. Especially, the realization of the Four Freedoms, the free movement of goods, capital,
services, and people, is quite powerful a leverage against the Member States.
It is this "four freedoms" that is instrumental in the expansion of the ECJ influence. The
supremacy and the direct effect of EC law has been made possible with these freedoms as the
telos of integration. EU law has to be prioritised because imported goods and service can be
directly or indirectly disadvantaged without uniform interpretation of EU-wide rules.
To the contrary, social policy may have been the least integrated policy domain except
foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty is the most recent major expansion of the EU competence.
In the Treaty after Nice revision, the Article three enlisting the community activities only indirectly
touches upon social policy. In the Chapter 11 "Social Policy", the Article 137 stipulates the
Community competence but with strict reservation saying that the "provisions adopted pursuant to
this article shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their
social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof". Further,
pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs are explicitly
excluded from the Community competence.
In short, the core of the Member States social security system is the least integrated policy
area. This is because economic disparity between the Member States is directly reflected in this
policy area and the historically accumulated "Welfare Regimes" are hard to integrate due to the
difference in ordering principle and methods.
(2) Union Citizenship and the Role of the ECJ
In contrast, EU-level social policy initiative is more prominent in the problems related to the
free movement of the person and anti-discrimination. As the former is in close connection with the
"four freedoms",  EU legislation began rather early, already in 1958. The latter came to the fore in
the 1990s. In both policy areas, the role of the ECJ has been decisive.
When the Union Citizenship clause was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, few had
expected that it would bring about far-reaching change. It was even disappointing to some as the
original Commission idea of an autonomous status was rejected and the Union Citizenship was
deemed "supplementary" to that of the Member States. 
Unexpected influence of the Union Citizenship has been created by the ECJ. The landmark
case is Grzelczyk (Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR Ⅰ-6193). In this judgement, the ECJ teats
the Union Citizenship as a fundamental status which can be directed against European or national
regulations circumscribing foreign nationals' rights. In the subsequent cases,  the ECJ has widened
the scope of application of the EU anti-discrimination norm from "workers" in narrow sense to
legally residing Member States nationals and thereby recognised the rights for social benefits.
Further, the reach of the norm has been deepened. While non-contributory social benefits are
explicitly excluded in the text of EU social security co-ordination laws, the ECJ declared that what
amounted to the "social benefit" was decided by the ECJ itself, not by the Member States. In effect,
- 6 -
the ECJ has recognised recipients' claim for some non-contributory benefits beyond the Member
States' original intention. These decisions has been justified in relation to the "four freedoms", as
the wide recognition of social benefits claim is said to facilitate the movement of the workers or the
people.
In anti-discrimination policy, the impact of the EU legislation is more direct. Soon after the
Amsterdam Treaty took effect in May 1995, two directives, namely the Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC) and the Equal Treatment Directive (2000/78/EC) was adopted in 2000. These
directives are sometimes referred to as "one of the most significant pieces of social legislation
recently adopted by the European Union" (Bell 2002, 384). They are the first specific anti-
discrimination legislation for many countries. Further, the directives instruct the Member States to
set up National Equality Bodies or to enable the some associations to intervene in the litigations on
behalf of the plaintiff.
It is to be noted here that these examples, social benefit rights for the foreign Member State
nationals or anti-discrimination policy, show that EU social policy is active and visible in those
policy areas where minimum protection of the individual's rights is at stake. Recent (soft) policy
initiatives on social exclusion (Silver 2003) or the introduction of minimum scheme (Francesco,
Haux, Matsaganis and Sutherland 2009) can be read in this light . This trend is resulting from twin
fundamental motor of EU legislation, the Four Freedoms and the Union Citizenship. In other words,
by securing common social minimum for the European citizen regardless of nationality, religion and
other attributes, freedom of movement and "Social Europe" is made compatible. This policy
direction in clearly stated in the explanation of proposal for a regulation of on coordination of social
security systems (COM(2003) 596 final):
"Coordination rules are not just intended to ensure free movement for employed
persons; they are also increasingly about protecting the social security rights of all persons
moving within the European Union. Coordination must therefore be seen from the
perspective of European citizenship and the building of a Social Europe" 
4. Clash of Individualised Policy and Collectivist Order: Examples of the ECJ Judgements
(1) Citizenship versus Collective Order
Universalised minimum protection based on the Union Citizenship might potentially be a
breakthrough for the reconstruction of the "Social" at the EU level. In reality, the relationship with
the existing social security system of the Member States is more of clash rather than
complementarity or mutual reinforcement. This is in stark contrast to the corporatist policy-making
framework analysed in the second section of the paper,  where the dynamic compatibility between
the EU and the Member States level comes to the fore.
A part of the reason is the liberalizing tendency inherent in EU policies. The failure of the
Constitutional Treaty referendum in France is the most prominent example, in which not just the
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Treaty itself but also then discussed infamous "Bolkenstein" service directive (Directive
2006/123/EC) was criticised as "unsocial". 
Still, there are examples in which the EU has played a role of an innovator or a promulgator
of social policy innovation, as in the cases of anti-discrimination or social exclusion. Even in these
cases, the EU policy initiatives are sometimes faced with reluctance or outright opposition from the
trade unions or the centre-left parties.. For example, in the discussion of the portability of the
supplementary pension, Gerd Andras (SPD), then the parliamentary state secretary for the
German federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, publicly criticised the planned directive
as undermining supplementary pension scheme in Germany. It is to be noted that he has been the
functionary of the Unon of the Chemical Workers (IG Chemie, Papier, Keramik) which has most
developed system of supplementary pension negotiated with the management.
This paper contends that this kind of "clash" is due to the difference in the logic of EU social
policy and the existing system of social and employment policy in the Member States. In other
words, the clash is not just  between "liberal" EU and "social" Member States but also between
different types of conceptions of the "Social". As is suggested above, EU social policy has a
tendency to grant "the "rights" for minimum social protection  to every "individual". In that sense, it
has the characteristic of social "citizenship" regardless of nationality (cf. Giubboni 2008: 3). To the
contrary, social and employment protection system of each Member States is more than the
collection of individual rights and entitlements. It is more or less the result of "historical
compromise" between societal groups and political parties. This aspect is highlighted in Esping-
Andersen's seminar book  "Three Worlds off Welfare Capitalism", in which welfare regimes are
classified according to leading political groups and its inherent logic. In short, it is a kind of "public
order".
The "rights based" nature of EU social policy is strengthened by the leading role of the ECJ
in policy development. The Judiciary in a given Member State may find a specific type of social
order as "their own" order and make due consideration to it even in relation to individual's
fundamental rights. In the growing diversity of social systems and norms, the ECJ cannot afford
this type of consideration. As the task of the ECJ is to find out common framework for all the
Member States, they cannot rely on a specific understanding of public order. In this regard,
individual's "fundamental rights" are quite useful and powerful instrument. It is common to the
Member States and can be used against ordinary (Member States) laws because fundamental
rights are supposed to be superior (Höpner 2008). In the next subsection, we will sketch concrete
examples of this kind of clash.
(2) Four ECJ judgements in Focus
In this subsection, we analyse four recent ECJ judgements (Viking, Laval, Rüffert,
Luxemburg) and political reactions to them. These judgements have been perceived as a severe
blow to the existing Member States social system and invite criticism from different angles. By the
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analysis of the judgements and reactions to them, we try to illuminate the importance of clash
between individualistic social policy and collective order.
The background of the conflict is the Posting Directive (Directive 96/71/EC). As a matter of
principle, free movement of persons and services makes a company possible to send workers to
other countries under the working condition which only fulfil the minimum standard of the sending
country, not that of the receiving country. As an exemption from this principle, this directive
stipulates that the receiving country "shall ensure that... the undertakings referred to in Article 1 (1)
guarantee workers posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment ... in the
Member State where the work is carried out", as far as such "core" of working condition as
maximum work periods, minimum rates of pay or provisions on non-discrimination is concerned.
The minimum condition shall be laid down  "by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or
by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable
within the meaning of paragraph 8". As is easily conceivable, which Member States rules fall within
"the terms and conditions of employment" of this directive is the source of conflict.
In Viking (C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Union Federation et al. v. Vikingline
ABP et al. [2007] ECR I-7779), the ECJ recognised, on the one hand, trade union's right to strike
and the prevention of social dumping as justifiable ground for the restriction of the four freedoms.
On the other hand, the Court did not affirm the relevant action of the Finnish Trade Union and
asked the referring (British) court to apply the proportionality principle in concrete judgement of the
relevant action.
In Laval (C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd vs. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet and
Others [2007] ECR I-5751), the point was whether Swedish law implementing the directive is valid
or not. The Swedish implementing law allowed the social partners to define the level of minimum
wage, as is common to other rules regulating the labour market. In other words, one of the central
elements of Swedish industrial relations was at stake. The judgement denied such implementation
and striking action of Swedish trade unions based on this understanding was deemed illegal.
In Rüffert (C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989), the
governments action as a party of contract was contested. German Land  government of
Niedersachsen made the application of collecive agreement in that land mandatory to the company
accepting a public construction order. As a company did not apply this to its subcontractor from
Poland, the Niedersachsen sued the company. Referred by German court, the ECJ answered that
securing of minimum working condition through public contract was not acceptable as a means
setting minimum standard defined by the directive and therefore illegal.
Finally in Luxemburg (C-319/06, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxemburg  [2008] ECR I-
4323), the Commission sued the government of Luxemburg for her impropoer implementation of
the directive in putting unnecessary restriction on the freedom of movement by applying the wage
slide to the minimum wage or requiring a contact person for monitoring. The ECJ sided with the
Commission, saying that compliance to the directive can be sufficiently monitored by the sending
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country and that only the minimum condition has to be clearly defined.
Through these four cases, the limit of the defensive action by the labour or the government
against service provision with low-paid workers is more precisely defined. The ECJ recognised
trade union's right as fundamental right and accept governments' justification of restriction on the
risk of social dumping, at least as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, all those protective measures
were denied their legality because minimum standard has to be literally "minimum" and clearly
defined by law or declaration of universal applicability, according to the ECJ.
(3) Political Reactions at the European level
Of course, the trade unions and the left parties criticised these judgements. The European
Trade Union Congress (ETUC) issued a declaration criticizing the judgement and advocating for
adoption of the "Social Progress Protocol" to be attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The European
Parliament showed their concern in the resolution "Challenges to collective agreements in the EU"
(2008/2085(INI)).
However, the Commission did not take concrete action. The relevant Commissioner Vladimír
Špidla answered in the EP debate as follows:
 "The social partners are best placed to rise to the challenge and to propose possible
improvements. Therefore, the Commission has invited the European social partners to
examine the consequences of increased mobility in Europe and the judgements of the
European Court of Justice. I am delighted that the European social partners have taken up
the challenge". 
They just organised a forum on "Protection of workers rights and economic freedoms:
Problems, pitfalls and challenges" in October 2008 with the participation of the government
representatives (Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg), officials of European interest groups and
researchers. Based on this discussion, a joint report was issued in March 2010 (Report on Joint
Work of the European Social Partners on the ECJ Rulings in the Viking, Laval, Ruffert and
Luxemburg Cases, 19.03.2010). In spite of its title, differing view of management and labour is
often juxtaposed in the report.  The setting up of an expert commission was agreed by the Council
in 2008 (C(2008)8604 final, Brussels, 19.12.2008),  hitherto with no visible result.
The European Council issued the "Solemn Declaration on Workers' Rights, Social Policy and
other issues"  in June 2009, in view of the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. In
the declaration, it is stated that "the Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners
at the level of the European Union, and facilitates dialogue between them, taking account of the
diversity of national systems and respecting the autonomy of social partners" (Presidency
Conclusions, Brussels, 10.07.2009, 11225/2/09 rev 2).  Further action is lacking.
- 10 -
(4) Reactions in the Member States: Case of Germany
Then, how was the reaction of the Member States who was denied her policy or policy-
making method? The Swedish Government had been adaptive. In the Council on Employment,
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs in March 2009, the Swedish Minister of Employment
expressed his dissatisfaction with the conclusions on the rulings by the ECJ but opposed to the
amendment of the directive, as it  might cause years and years of legal uncertainty and it would
result in less flexibility (Council of the European Union, 13081/09, Brussels, 10.09.2010).
On the contrary,  the reaction of the German public opinion had been intense, already before
the Rüffert judgement. The Federal Ministry of labour and Social Affairs organised a symposium in
June 2008 titled  "the Influence of the Judgements of the European Court of Justice on the labour
Law of the Member States" (BMAS 2008), inviting experts which include an ECJ judge. More
influential in the public discussion was the intervention of prominet public figures. Fritz W. Sharpf,
who is one of the most famous German reserachers on the EU, published an essay with a
provocative title "the Only Way is not to Follow the ECJ" (Scharpf 2008) in a magazin of the
German Trade Union Federation. In that article, he suggested a possible rejection of  the doctrin of
supremacy of the EU law. It was consonant with a similary anti-ECJ essay "Stop the ECJ!"  by the
former President Roman Herzog, although this had been made in a different context. In this way,
the role of the ECJ was highlighted.
On the occasion  of the debate on the Lisbon Treaty in the German Federal Parliament, the
Left Party made a vocal opposition to the judgements and the Lisbon Treaty. In contrast, the
Greens took a clear pro-European stance. Jürgen Trittin, past Environment Minister of the Red-
Green Coalition, said, "we need to make Germany Europe-comatible" and criticised the incumbent
government saying:
"[Rüffert Judgement] is not a bad judgement. Rather, it is the consequence of the
failure of the Grand Coalition. This judgement comes because the declaration of universal
applicablity cannot be issued to the collective agreement" (Deutscher Bundestag, 16. WP.,
157. Sitzung, 24.4.2008). 
Social Democrats were on the defensive as a part of the government taking a "yes to the
Treaty but..." stance. After the ratification by the parliament, however, the Social Democrats revised
the course and issued a joint motion with the trade unions urging the addition of "social progress
clause" to the Treaty (Für ein Europa des sozialen Fortschirtts: Gemeinsames Positionspapier von
SPD und DGB; Deutscher Bundestag, 16. WP., 224. Sitzung, 28.5.2009, Plenarprotokolle, 16/224,
24712B-24717C).
German sensitiveness to the judgements can be partly explained by the quasi-constitutional
notion of Tarifautonomie, or the autonomy of the social partners. The Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany reads in the Article 9, Paragraph 3 as follows:
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"The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic
conditions shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profession.
Agreements that restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures
directed to this end shall be unlawful. Measures taken pursuant to Article 12a, to
paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35, to paragraph (4) of Article 87a, or to Article 91 may not
be directed against industrial disputes engaged in by associations within the meaning of the
fi rst sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic
conditions"
The Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted this text as meaning the delegation of core
domain of the collective agreement system itself to the social partners by the state (Löwisch 1989).
In the seminal judgement the Federal Constitutional Court states "the purpose of the collective
agreements is to give an order to working life" (BVerfG vom 18.11.1954. BVerfGE 4, 96ff, hier 108).
This is not only a reaction to the state regulation of industrial relations in the Nazi period but
also an expression of critical reflection on the Weimar experience, in which the autonomous
conflict resolution did not function smoothly and the governments were often forced to resort to
compulsory arbitration (cf. Nautz 1985). Due to this historical background, the (West) German
indutrial relations is charcterised by the scarce use of governmental instruments as wage freeze.
The declaration of general applicability, which may be invoked as substitute for governmental
regulation, has been issued only sporadically. In short, the norm of government restraint in the
regulation of industrial relations and autonomous rule-making by the social partners was
established and took root so firmly as a kind of constitution in material sense.
As the ECJ judgements was seen as a frontal assault on this quasi-constitutional norm, it is
no wonder that the German public reacted with such sensitiveness. In addition, as far as the
Rüffert judgement is concerned, similar law in the Berlin City was already sanctioned by the
Federal Constitutional Court, which added further fuel to the fire.
(5) The Real Stake of the Conflict
Rogre Liddle, former advisor to Tony Blair, summarised Scharpf's argument as "warning that
the European project represents a judicial entrenchment of neoliberalism needs to be treated with
the utmost seriousness" (Liddle 2008, 27). Although Scharpf's argument was more nuanced, the
"ECJ equals neo-liberalism" thesis can be seen elsewhere and Scharpf himself talked of "judicial
deregulation" in a later article (Scharpf 2010). Has the ECJ become neo-liberal?
Theoretically, it is plausible to infer neo-liberalization from the eastern enlargement after
2004,  as the new Member States with generally lower social security standard and looser
regulation have more to gain from the liberalization of the older Member States. Höpner proposed
a framework to analyse political influence on the ECJ judgements and suggested that the
nationality of the judges may influence the decision (Höpner 2009). In fact, in the cases shown
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above, the judges from the new Member States occupied more than a half in some cases. In the
EP debates, the nationality is clearly discernable independent of the partisan left-right position
(European Parliament Debates, 21.10.2010). On the one hand, an MEP from the German Centre-
right CDU said:
"We need to say a clear ‘no’ to any kind of social dumping and a clear ‘no’ to attempts
to create ‘letterbox companies’ intended to avoid minimum standards for pay and working
conditions. Social principles must not be subordinated to economic freedoms."
On the other hand, a socialist MEP from Estonia supported the judgement, writing:
"Unfortunately, the desire of several Western European trade union organisations to
close markets to the new Member States once again will not help unite Europe"
In our view, the four judgements can be interpreted in line with the previous ones. In Viking,
the Court states that "it is for the national court to determine whether the jobs or conditions of
employment of that trade union’s members who are liable to be affected by the reflagging of the
Rosella were jeopardised or under serious threat (paragraph 83, emphasis added)". This means
that what can be protected against four freedoms is a specific interest of individual workers
(Kocher 2008). This corresponds to a series of anti-discrimination decisions which protected
individual's social rights.
In Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg, the issue is almost the same; "What constitutes an
enforcable minimum standard?" In Laval, Swedish tradition of autonomous regulation of the social
partners is denied. In Rüffert, an indirect way of the government procurement falls outside
justifiable minimum. In Luxembourg, too, the blanket recognition of universally applicable collective
agreements in the Luxembug Law is found incompatible with the directive (paragraphs 62-69). All
these indicate that  the minimum standard must be transparent and therefore defined by a statutory
law or universally applicable collective agreements with specific content. It is not about the
substance of the minimum standard but the way the norm was established. 
Then, what is the source for controversy? From the viewpoint of this paper, It is an individual-
right orientation and relative disregard for the collective order aspects in those judgements. In the
above mentioned symposium convened by the German government, the representative of the
Swedish Trade Union expressed their concern as follows, which illuminates our point:
"[T]he ECJ did much more than necessary in the Laval case. Carefully developed
balances in national industrial relations systems have been distorted. One should keep in
mind that EU has 27 different labour market models. They all reflect different balances of
power between Capital and Labour. The ECJ will become largely unpopular as it moves
delicately balanced power between the social partners in the Members States."
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He added further:
"This [is] in contrast with the so called continental models where the State have a
more primary role in the regulation of the labour market. It appears as if the ECJ measures
the Swedish (or Scandinavian) autonomous labour market models through a lens shaped
by a continental view" (Speech by Claes-Mikael Jonsson, in BMAS 2008).
The criticisms made by Blanke (2008) resonate with this statement. One of his points is that
the recoginition of the right to strike by the ECJ is limited for the purpose of the protection of the
workers. In his view, trade unions should be given greater role than that.
In contrast, the ECJ prioritses individual rights protection and sees the state as the standard
setter. In the words of Loïc Azoulai, who spent three years in the ECJ as Référendaire in the
Cabinet of General Advocate Poiares Maduro:
"What is at issue, in the eyes of the court is not so much the substance of social
obligations...; it is the way these obligations are fixed...  The State alone is habilitated to
define the social model applicable to all businesses on its territory. This condemns
autonomous collective actions undertaken to the same end" (Azoulai 2008)
In Laval, the Court characterised Swedish collective agreements as "not public in nature
but ... designed to regulate, collectively, the provision of services" (paragraph 98). Different
interpretation of the relationship between the "public" and the "collective" is contested here. 
5. Summary of the Argument and Implication
Let us summarise our arguments. First, the EU has a structure of corporatist policy-making
involving the social partners and civil society organizations. It is an import from the Member States,
but exceeds most of them in its semi-legislative function and wider coverage including civil society.
In this regard, the EU and the Member States share a common element.
Second, EU social policy has a specific characteristic. It aims at universal protection of social
minimum regardless of nationality, sex or race. For this purpose, the Union Citizenship has been
quite instrumental. 
Third, two elements shown above are in conflict. The real issue of recent ECJ judgements is
not "liberal versus social" or "integration versus autonomy". The conflict is between two different
aspects of social and employment policy; individual rights protection and collective public order.
As an extension of this argument, we may speculate that self-defeating logic is inherent in
EU social policy. The more the EU tried to enhance the social aspects of integration with the help
of the ECJ, the further individualization of social policy proceeds and the less stable collective rule-
making system becomes. It can be a crucial problem for the EU, as the setting up of the corporatist
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policy-community is intended to bypass Member States' resistance and to enhance democratic
legitimacy of the EU. With weak legitimacy basis and high hurdle of political consensus building in
the Council, the judiciary-induced development of EU social policy may fall victim to its own (partial
) success.
Notes
[1] The number is based on the Social Dialogue Texts Database on the Commission website as of
February 25, 2011 <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521&langId=en>.
[2] The following overview of Belgian industrial relations is based on Humblet (2005, 31-36) and
Mommen and Aldcroft (1994, 75-82).
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